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2
TARGETING COBELLIGERENTS
Jens David Ohlin

I. Introduction
The current debate about targeted killings has revolved around the central divide
between jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Either the launching of a drone strike is
considered a defensive use of force to be evaluated under the traditional rules of
self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter, or the drone strike is to be evaluated under the rules of warfare codiﬁed in international humanitarian law.1 The
prohibition against the killing of civilians is of particular concern here. Of course,
the two issues are not mutually exclusive. One can coherently claim that drone
strikes satisfy the demands of jus ad bellum but fail to live up to the requirements
of jus in bello, and are therefore illegal.2 The reverse is possible as well. One might
conclude that targeted killings do not run afoul of international humanitarian law
(IHL) but violate the core ad bellum prohibition against the unlawful use of force
codiﬁed in the UN Charter. These are all logical permutations of the argument.
At a conceptual level, international law is deeply conﬂicted about how to handle
targeted killings; the issue falls between the state-based system of public international law and the individualized system of domestic criminal law. The former
contemplates armed conﬂicts between combatants who open themselves up to the
reciprocal risk of killing; the latter contemplates killings in self-defense only when
1 See, e.g., Mary Ellen O’Connell, “Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of
Pakistan, 2004–2009” in Simon Bronitt ed., Shooting to Kill: The Law Governing Lethal Force in
Context (Hart Publishing, forthcoming) (concluding that targeted killings violate both spheres
of the law of war); Philip Alston, Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Execution: Study
on Targeted Killings, delivered to the Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May
28, 2010).
2
Cf. Jordan J. Paust, “Self-Defense Targetings of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of U.S.
Use of Drones in Pakistan,” 19 J. Transnational Law and Policy (2010) 237 (concluding that drone
strikes are a valid exercise of self-defense).
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Targeting Co-belligerents
the traditional progression of arrest, trial, and punishment is unavailable. Because
the terrorist is a non-state actor who falls between these two categories, the current law has had diﬃculty not only providing a positive rule regarding the legality
of targeted killings, but also deﬁnitively choosing the correct paradigm. Even the
application of traditional rules of IHL to the activity remains contested, since such
an application presupposes that one paradigm has been selected over the other.3
It may even be the case that no positive rule of customary international law has
crystallized to govern the practice.4
Assuming, arguendo, that some form of targeted killing is permissible in some situations, a central and deeply contested question remains: who can be targeted and
why? The selection of paradigms again structures our natural intuitions about the
answer. Those concerned with national security are inclined to view the question
through the lens of the laws of war, where all bona ﬁde combatants are assumed to
be targetable with lethal force. Those concerned with civil liberties are inclined to
view the question through the lens of the criminal law (or domestic law more generally), where a judge or jury determines outcomes based on a rigorous fact-ﬁnding
process, and where capture and punishment—not killing—is the default norm.
The question of targeting straddles the tension between national security and civil
liberties and it is unclear how it can (or should) be resolved.
This chapter investigates the tension between national security and civil liberties
through a distinctive conceptual framework: What linking principle can be used to
connect the targeted individual with the collective group that represents the security threat? Section II will explain and defend this methodology by demonstrating
that no account of targeted killing—whether sounding in jus in bello or jus ad
bellum—can be complete without making explicit reference to a linking principle.
Section III will then proceed to catalog ﬁve major linking principles—taken from
diﬀerent domains of law including the use of force, international humanitarian
law, and criminal law—that could potentially serve that function: direct participation, co-belligerency, membership, control, and complicity/conspiracy. Section
IV will then conclude with a comparative evaluation of the linking principles that
exposes their strengths and weaknesses.
The resulting conclusion will be counter-intuitive to readers accustomed to the
standard positions in the literature. Although one would think that criminal law
principles, with their strict adherence to conduct rules and culpability, would
result in the greatest maximization of civil liberties, this intuition is not realized
once the criminal law principles are divorced from their traditional legal process:
3 See Gabriella Blum and Philip Heymann, “Law and Policy of Targeted Killing,” 1 Harvard
National Security Journal (2010) 145 (comparing two paradigms: war and exceptional peacetime
operations).
4
See S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18.
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the courtroom. The question of who can be targeted (and the individual’s relationship to the collective) requires a more nuanced response, one that uses the
legal concepts developed for the law of war, but properly reformulated to take into
account the realities of asymmetrical warfare with non-state terrorist organizations. The legal concepts developed for use in criminal trials provide false comfort
that one is respecting civil liberties, but ironically they oﬀer fewer protections. In
the end, reformulated and redeﬁned law of war principles, with their reliance on
status concepts and proxies such as membership, do the job better because the
concepts are comparatively more public, transparent, and self-administering than
their competitors in the criminal law.
II. The problem of linking
Regardless of which paradigm is selected, there is inevitably a deep conceptual
puzzle that straddles both sides of the fundamental divide between jus ad bellum and jus in bello. In both cases, it is unlikely that the single individual who is
targeted—in isolation—satisﬁes the demands of either argument. The individual
must be linked to a larger collective—a larger belligerent force—that explains the
relevancy of the single individual. This linking requirement is a function of both
the jus ad bellum and jus in bello analyses, for example, one cannot simply avoid
the linking issue by switching from jus ad bellum to jus in bello or vice versa.
Within the context of jus ad bellum, the traditional argument for a drone attack
relies on the international doctrine of self-defense, recognized in Article 51 of the
UN Charter but also certainly recognized in customary law as well as the just
war tradition.5 The United States has argued publicly that their drone attacks in
Yemen, Pakistan, and Afghanistan are supported by the doctrine of self-defense.6
However, under any version of the principle of self-defense—whether expounded
by public international lawyers or legal philosophers—the target of the defensive counter-attack must constitute a threat to the United States or its allies.7 The
underlying threat makes the defensive force “necessary”—a universally recognized constraint on the use of force in self-defense under either basic principles

5 Compare Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, (Advisory Opinion on the Wall) 2004 I.C.J. 136, 189, 194 (July 9,
2004) (no international right of self-defense against non-state actors), with Armed Activities on
the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, 222–6 (December 19).
See also Mary Ellen O’Connell, “The Legal Case Against the Global War on Terror,” 36 Case West
Reserve Journal of International Law (2004) 349.
6 See Harold H. Koh, U.S. Department of State, Th e Obama Administration and International
Law, Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, Washington, DC (March 25,
2010), available at <http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm> accessed November 4,
2011.
7
See Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 7th edn. (Oxford University Press,
2008) 732–3.
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of criminal law or international law.8 The notion that self-defense is a necessary
response to a threat is part of the universal structure of self-defense arguments in
any legal or moral context.9
My point here is not to advocate for any particular version of what constitutes a
“threat”—nor what makes a defensive response to it “necessary.” These are sticky
theoretical questions that form the center of most debates about self-defense.
Rather, the issue I want to explore is one level deeper. Regardless of one’s assessment of what constitutes a threat to a state’s interests—territorial integrity, political independence, etc—it is unlikely that a single individual, by himself or herself,
can constitute a threat against a state. It is theoretically possible to imagine a hypothetical terrorist who works alone, secretly plotting a devastating attack against a
state by procuring weapons and then deploying them without any assistance whatsoever. The Unabomber is one such example, and it is the exception that proves the
rule.10
The more common situation involves the existence of a terrorist organization or
militia that constitutes a threat by plotting and implementing terrorist or military attacks against a particular state. In such cases, the collective constitutes
the threat against the national interest, thus generating the right of self-defense.
Furthermore, the individual stands in a certain relationship with the collective,
either by belonging to the terrorist organization, contributing to the collective
endeavor, or some other mode of participation in the collective group.11 For the
moment we must postpone consideration of which linking principle is most
appropriate. The point here is simply that individuals acting alone almost never
constitute a national threat. Within the War on Terror and the asymmetrical use
of targeted killings against non-state actors, an even stronger conclusion is warranted: single individuals never constitute a threat to the United States. The threat
comes from organized groups with political or ideological objectives that they
seek to bring about by launching attacks against civilians. Th is is the raison d’être
of global terrorism and jihadism.
Shifting the focus to jus in bello does not relieve us of the obligation to ﬁnd an
appropriate linking principle. If terrorists are simply enemy civilians, without any
8

Ibid. at 734 (citing Caroline case).
On the structural similarity of the necessity prong in both national and individual self-defense,
see G.P Fletcher and J.D. Ohlin, Defending Humanity: When Force is Justiﬁed and Why (Oxford
University Press, 2008) 91–6.
10 Indeed, for some theorists, the isolated and individualistic nature of the Unabomber’s criminal
activities precludes applying to him the label of terrorist, a term usually reserved for organizational
eﬀorts. See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, “The Indeﬁnable Concept of Terrorism,” 4 J. International
Criminal Justice (2006) 894, 907–08 (organization as one element of the family-resemblance concept of terrorism).
11
For a discussion of participation in collective endeavors, see generally Christopher Kutz,
Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age (Cambridge University Press, 2000).
9
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relationship to a larger collective, then no operative principle of IHL permits their
summary killing.12 It is only when their relationship to a larger collective is considered that the use of force against them may be permissible. Under traditional rules
of IHL, combatants may be killed to the extent that they belong to an armed ﬁghting force that is engaged in an armed conﬂict with the United States.13 Indeed, it is
the collective’s engaging of the armed conﬂict with the United States that triggers
the operation of the IHL norm allowing combatants to be killed. But it is an open
question whether IHL recognizes the existence of an armed conﬂict with a nonstate actor, and whether this is best described as an international armed conﬂict
triggering the Geneva Conventions, a non-international armed conﬂict triggering Common Article 3 of the same, or neither, thus generating conﬂict regarding
the appropriate default rule in the absence of any governing Geneva Convention
regime.14
In this context, there are multiple problems associated with linking an individual
to the larger terrorist organization that is engaged in an armed conﬂict with the
United States. First, the United States is currently engaged in an armed conﬂict
(international or non-international) with Al Qaeda, but the individuals targeted
by US drones may or may not be card-carrying members of Al Qaeda.15 Indeed,
although Al Qaeda may once have been a deﬁned and tightly-knit organization
controlled by Osama bin Laden, the organization has morphed into an amorphous network of terrorist organizations operating under the common banner of
Al Qaeda.16 In rare instances, various local terrorist organizations operating under
the name Al Qaeda may share operational or ﬁnancial support from their parent organization, and may even respond to hierarchical commands issued by bin
Laden himself or his commanders.
In most cases, however, terrorist organizations operating under the banner of Al
Qaeda in some form are part of a much looser confederacy of co-sympathetic
12 See Dieter Fleck, Th e Handbook of International Humanitarian Law, 2nd edn. (Oxford
University Press, 2008) 46 (“The outbreak of an armed conﬂict between two states will lead to
many of the rules of ordinary law of peace being superseded, as between the parties to the conﬂict,
by the rules of humanitarian law.”)
13
Ibid. at 82. See also Richard Murphy and Afsheen John Radsan, “Due Process and Targeted
Killing of Terrorists,” 32 Cardozo Law Review (2009) 405, 416.
14
See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630 (2006) (conﬂict with Al Qaeda is a non-international armed conﬂict falling under Common Article 3). For a discussion, see D. Glazier, “Full
and Fair by What Measure?: Identifying the International Law Regulating Military Commission
Procedure,” 24 Boston University International Law Journal (2006) 55, 60 (“Recognizing that the
terrorism conﬂict does not ﬁt particularly well with traditional classiﬁcations of either ‘international’ or ‘non-international’ armed conﬂict, it concludes that this war is instead best deﬁned as
‘transnational’.”)
15
See O’Connell, “Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan, 2004–
2009”, supra n.1,10–11.
16
See Manooher Moﬁdi and Amy E. Eckert, ‘ “Unlawful Combatants” or “Prisoners of War”:
The Law and Politics of Labels,’ 36 Cornell International Law Journal (2003) 59, 82.
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jihadists who share common inspiration and rhetoric without sharing a common
command structure or operational command.17 They are distinct terrorist organizations linked together by a common cause. It is therefore unclear if the existence
of an armed conﬂict with one Al Qaeda organization can translate into an armed
conﬂict with another sympathetic Al Qaeda organization.18 In some instances,
both organizations may be suﬃciently well developed that each, on its own terms,
meets the appropriate standard for being engaged in an armed conﬂict with the
United States. In other contexts, however, the over-arching umbrella between the
organizations may be crucial for our legal determination of an armed conﬂict with
the United States. This is particularly true in cases where one terrorist organization
is well developed and clearly engaged in an armed conﬂict, but the second organization is a nascent and burgeoning endeavor that has not yet launched signiﬁcant
attacks.
III. Five possible linking principles
The preceding analysis suggests that both the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello
analyses suﬀer from a deeper confusion about how to relate the individual terrorist
with the larger collective. Attacking the problem in this manner will help expose
the deeper question of how to integrate the non-state actor—and the individual
terrorist—into the inherently collective nature of public international law and the
laws of war that arise from it. We should therefore consider all of the possible linking principles and consider which best describes the particular role and function
of the individual terrorist. The possible linking principles include: direct participation in an armed conﬂict, military membership, co-belligerency, control, complicity, and conspiracy.19 A comparative evaluation of the linking principles will cut
across the jus ad bellum-jus in bello divide.
(a) Direct participation in an armed conﬂict
Under a standard jus in bello analysis, civilians are generally protected from the
reciprocal risk of killing that governs the relations of enemy soldiers.20 Obviously,
though, this protection can be opportunistically exploited by civilians who use
their protected status to pursue attacks without subjecting themselves to reciprocal
risk.21 Such a system of perﬁdy would create a perverse incentive: soldiers would
have no incentive to identify themselves as soldiers—the only consequence of their
identiﬁcation would be one of exposure. Consequently, traditional rules of jus in
17

See, e.g., United States v. Mustafa, 406 Fed. Appx. 526 (2nd Cir. 2011).
For a discussion, see Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, “Congressional Authorization
and the War on Terrorism,” 118 Harvard Law Review (2005) 2047, 2112.
19 The list of linking principles is not meant to be exhaustive, but rather to include a representative cross-section of the relevant types.
20
See Fleck, The Handbook, supra n. 12, 96–7, 237–8.
21
Ibid. at 80.
18
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bello deny protected status to civilians who directly participate in the armed conﬂict.22 The functional justiﬁcation for this rule is obvious: civilians who engage in
combatancy are functionally equivalent to traditional combatants and ought to be
treated similarly, that is, ought to be subject to attack. This rule is now codiﬁed in
Article 51(3) of Additional Protocol 1, which states that “civilians shall enjoy the
protection aﬀorded by this section, unless and for such time as they take a direct
part in hostilities.”23
The concept of “direct participation” links the individual to the collective ﬁghting force that is engaged in hostilities. The protection is not lost simply by
virtue of holding a gun. 24 If the linking principle merely required the use of
weapons, it would have stated that. Rather, the linking principle establishes a
quasi-causal relation between the non-protected civilian and the larger armed
conﬂ ict. Unfortunately, though, nobody really knows what constitutes “direct
participation” in an armed conﬂ ict. The term is undeﬁ ned in the Optional
Protocol and there is little case law on the subject. The International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC) notes that it is clear that the “lawfulness of an attack on
a civilian depends on what exactly constitutes direct participation in hostilities
and, related thereto, when direct participation begins and when it ends . . . [but]
the meaning of direct participation in hostilities has not yet been clariﬁed,”
and concedes that a legal deﬁ nition of the term does not even exist.25 The ICRC
Commentary cites the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights for the
proposition that the concept of “direct participation” in hostilities means “acts
which, by their nature or purpose, are intended to cause actual harm to enemy
personnel and material.”26 Although this interpretation of the concept has some
intuitive appeal, it reduces it to a causal criterion—not an inherently objectionable result, although the type and closeness of causal relation is left similarly
undeﬁ ned.
As any good lawyer knows, the real issue is never whether causation is present or
not, but rather what type of causation (but-for, proximate, etc) and whether the
causation between the act in question and the desired consequence is close enough
to meet the applicable standard. Many genuinely civilian actions that patriotically
22
See International Committee of the Red Cross, Customary International Humanitarian Law
(Cambridge University Press, 2005) vol. I, 19–24 (hereafter cited as ICRC Commentary).
23
See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conﬂicts (Additional Protocol I), adopted June 8,
1977, art. 51(3), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
24
Even civilians retain the right of individual self-defense, which might be one reason to retain
small arms even in a conﬂict zone. This complicates the ascription of combatancy to individuals carrying weapons—a particular problem during the recent ﬁghting in Libya. See, e.g., Thom Shanker
and Charlie Savage, “NATO Warns Libyan Rebels Against Attacking Civilians,” New York Times
(March 31, 2011).
25
See ICRC Commentary, supra n. 22, 173, vol. 1, 21.
26
Ibid., vol. II, 114.
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support a nation’s interest would eventually and predictably cause some harm to
enemy personnel, but no one would ever suggest that they constitute direct participation in hostilities.27
One can imagine a spectrum of participatory acts. At one end of the spectrum are
acts that unquestionably represent acts of combatancy, such as ﬁring a weapon
at the enemy. No one doubts that this constitutes direct participation. At the
other end of the spectrum, one might place activities such as a civilian seamstress
who sews uniforms in a civilian factory that will one day be worn by soldiers. Or
consider the cook who resides far from the battleﬁeld and makes frozen food,
some of which will be sold to the military for inclusion in MREs (Meals Ready
to Eat). Th is clearly does not rise to the level of direct participation. In the middle of the spectrum are the hard cases: the civilian contractor who repairs a tank
on the battleﬁeld, or the civilian defense department employee who helps design
or deploy a new weapons system. Are these individuals directly participating in
hostilities?28
One way to get a handle on direct participation is to compare it with indirect
participation. The ICRC Commentary cites the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights for the proposition that “mere support” of the military eﬀort by
civilian personnel—including commercial sales and “expressing sympathy for
the cause of one of the parties”—constitutes indirect participation.29 The asserted
rationale for this conclusion is that these forms of participation do not involve “acts
of violence which pose an immediate threat of actual harm to the adverse party.”30
The concept of immediacy appears to be doing all of the work here, though it is
unclear if immediacy is as signiﬁcant as the Inter-American Commission believes
it to be. Similarly, the ICRC notes that a draft statute for the future International
Criminal Court deﬁned participating in hostilities to include scouting, spying,
and sabotage, but excluded food deliveries and household domestic staﬀ “in an
oﬃcer’s married accommodation.”31
At Nuremberg, Streicher, Goebels, and others who ran the Nazi propaganda eﬀort
were held responsible for aiding the Nazi war machine.32 Indeed, Streicher was
charged with criminal responsibility for his writings, which in today’s legal climate
would have been described as direct and public incitement to commit genocide, in

27

Cf. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 3d edn. (Basic Books, 2000) 146.
The United States Naval Handbook states that guards, lookouts, and intelligence acts all meet
the direct participation standard. See ICRC Commentary, supra n. 22, 173, vol. 1, 22.
29 Ibid., vol. II, 114 (citing Th ird Report on Human Rights in Columbia, Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/
II.102 Doc. 9 rev. 1, February 26, 1999, paras 53–6).
30 Ibid.
31
ICRC Commentary, supra n. 22, 173, vol. II, 116.
32
Reifenstahl might also be included in that list, though she was never prosecuted for her
ﬁlms.
28
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the words of the Rome Statute.33 When NATO bombed Serb positions in order to
pressure Serbia to withdraw forces from Kosovo, the targets included Serbian state
television and other elements of the state’s communications regime.34 Although
reasonable persons can disagree over the permissibility of these attacks, I take it
that the disagreement stems more from the civilian nature of the employees at the
state television station, rather than the indirect nature of their causal contribution to the war eﬀort. In many of these situations, the causal role played by the
non-military civilians is quite substantial and might even be described as direct.35
Perhaps this is the reason that the US Naval Handbook simply concludes that the
direct participation standard “must be judged on a case-by-case basis.”36
The ICRC’s latest eﬀort, its Interpretative Guidance on Direct participation in
Hostilities, also cashes out the concept in causal terms.37 Indeed, according to the
ICRC, the word “direct” in the legal standard explicitly refers to direct causation as opposed to indirect causation.38 According to the ICRC’s metaphysics, a
direct causal result implies that the “harm in question must be brought about in
one causal step.”39 In applying this standard, the ICRC Interpretative Guidance
concludes that building or maintaining the ﬁghting capacity of one party to the
conﬂict is not suﬃciently direct because it is a two-step process. Even recruitment
of combatants and their military training are excluded because they are two-step
processes.40 Temporal and geographic proximity may imply causal proximity, but
they do not wholly determine it, since an action could (in theory) directly cause a
particular harm far removed in time and space.41

33

See Judgment, Streicher, International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg; D.F. Orentlicher,
Criminalizing Hate Speech in the Crucible of Trial: Prosecutor v. Nahimana, 21 American University
Int’ l L. Rev. (2006) 557, 582–3.
34 Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing
Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 39 I.L.M. 1257 (2000).
35 Cf. Sandoz, Swinarski and Zimmerman, Commentary on the Additional Protocols (Martinus
Nijhoﬀ Publishers, 1987) 619 (discussing distinction between direct participation in hostilities and
the more general participation in the war eﬀort and noting that “even the morale of the population
plays a role in this context,” but concluding that without a distinction between direct and general
participation “international humanitarian law could become meaningless”).
36
See ICRC Commentary, supra n 22, 173, vol. I, 24. However, the US Air Force handbook oﬀers
additional examples: civilian ground observers that report the approach of hostile aircraft and rescuers of downed military airmen. See ibid., vol. II, 117.
37
Interpretative Guidance, (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2009), 1019 (requiring a
“direct causal link between a speciﬁc act and the harm likely to result either from that act, or from a
coordinated military operation of which that act constitutes an integral part.”).
38
Ibid. at 1021.
39
Ibid.
40
Ibid. at 1022 (but concluding that if recruitment and training are for a particular hostile act,
these activities are considered “integral” to the hostile act and therefore stand in a one-step causal
relation to the harm).
41
Ibid. at 1023.
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The direct participation standard is diﬃcult to apply to terrorists, and there is
currently little uniform state practice that would shed light on the content of the
alleged customary norm. On the one hand, some nations take a purely causal
approach to the notion, whereby any civilian who contributes to the armed conﬂict
loses protected status. For example, India believes that any person who “contributes towards the furtherance of armed conﬂict” is no longer a protected civilian.42
On the other hand, some countries conclude that “persons who merely provided
support to the enemy . . . for example those who supplied it with weapons, food or
medicine,” do not lose their protected status.43 In between, some nations recognize
the inherent ambiguity and lack of clarity in the standard. For example, Israeli
practice notes that the carrying of arms is not a suﬃcient condition for losing protected status, since in many locations (for example, Lebanon), civilians routinely
carry ﬁrearms even though they have nothing to do with the hostilities, though the
Israel report notes that “when returning ﬁre, it is extremely diﬃcult (and probably
unwise from a military viewpoint) to diﬀerentiate between those individuals actually ﬁring their ﬁrearms and those just carrying them.”44
The ambiguity becomes starker when one considers another linking principle that
is often applied to terrorists: providing material support to terrorists. The United
States considers this to be a war crime and a violation of both federal and international law.45 Does providing material support for terrorism constitute direct participation in hostilities? Did Hamdan “directly participate” in the hostilities because
he was driving Osama bin Laden?46 The thing about providing material support is
that it rests squarely on the shoulders of a causal contribution to the larger eﬀort. If
the individual’s actions make a terrorist attack more likely—for example, if he aids
or abets the larger eﬀort—then the individual has provided material support to
terrorism.47 Consequently, providing ﬁnancial support or engaging in advocacy on
behalf of a terrorist cause can constitute material support, since terrorist activities
require far more than just brute operational support.48 Many other forms of support
are required to bring a terrorist plan to fruition. But providing ﬁnancial support or
ideological advocacy is a far cry from a direct participation in hostilities. What is
missing is not a causal link, but the right kind of causal link.

42

Ibid., vol. II, 109.
Ibid., vol. II, 121.
44 Ibid., vol. II, 120–1. See also Shanker and Savage, “NATO Warns” supra n 24, 175.
45 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2339B.
46 Cf. George P. Fletcher, “On the Crimes Subject to Prosecution in Military Commissions,” 5
Journal of International Criminal Justice (2007) 39.
47 Ibid. (“Virtually any aid or assistance to an organization labeled terrorist would be suﬃcient
to trigger liability. Under these provisions, Bin Laden’s driver would clearly be guilty for providing
‘transportation.’ Anyone who contributes money to terrorist organizations (or one so denominated)
is guilty.”).
48
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2720 (2010).
43
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Although everyone agrees that direct participation requires the right kind of causal
link, distinguishing between a direct and indirect causal contribution is far from
easy. The “one-step” view espoused by the ICRC Interpretative Guidance appears
to boil down to the idea that the causal contribution must be operational and on
the battleﬁeld, while indirect contributions emanate from beyond the conﬁnes
of battleﬁeld activity as they have been traditionally deﬁned.49 But this is not so
obvious.50 Directness appeals to the closeness of the causal route, which may or
may not accord with a battleﬁeld movement. It is, for example, possible to envision a close ﬁnancial connection as well as a remote battleﬁeld connection. Each
of these possibilities puts pressure on our intuition that the concept of directness
correlates essentially with prototypical battleﬁeld activity.51 In other words, the
closeness of the causal connection and the shape of the causal route can slip apart. An
individual might engage in activity that has only a remote bearing on the hostilities
(for example, bearing a weapon when there is no enemy in sight), but the relation
between the action and the hostilities can be seen in a straight line. In contrast, an
individual might engage in activity that has a strong correlation with the hostilities
(for example, transporting a crucial weapon that will change the tide of the battle),
but the relation between the action and the hostilities involves a comparatively
more circuitous route. At ﬁrst glance, it is not clear whether the causal element of
the direct participation standard ought to be understood with regard to closeness
or shape.52
(b)Co-belligerency under the law of neutrality
Another solution to the linking problem is to employ the doctrine of co-belligerency from the well-traveled law of neutrality.53 Under this doctrine, states
engaged in an international armed conﬂict are allowed to consider third-party
49 See ICRC Interpretative Guidance, supra n. 37, 1021 (defending one-step causal criterion over
allegedly wider alternatives such as “materially facilitating harm”).
50 The one-step view of causation was controversial among the ICRC working group members.
Compare, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, “Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The
Constitutive Elements”, 42 N.Y.U. Journal of International Law & Policy (2010) 697, 727, with
Melzer, “Keeping the Balance,” supra n. 67, 865–8 (defending one-step causal relation). In particular, Melzer concludes that Schmitt’s more permissive deﬁnition of causation amounts to an “unlimited causal chain” that would extend as far downstream as the causal relation extends, including
individuals who design, manufacture, and store weaponry. Ibid. at 868. Melzer concludes that
although this wide causal criterion would be appropriate for ex post determination of criminal
responsibility, it is inappropriate for an ex ante determination of combatancy under the direct participation standard. Ibid.
51
The ICRC Interpretive Guidance, supra n. 37, 1022, goes part of the way to understanding this
issue by noting that the concept of directness must be understood within the context of the collective nature of the hostilities, such that individual actions may produce little causation on their own,
but when aggregated together, contribute to the collective hostilities. However, even the notion of
collective hostilities does not resolve the tension between directness and shape of the causal route.
52
The laity’s common-sense understanding of the concept of directness arguably includes an
ambiguity with regard to closeness vs. shape.
53
See Fleck, The Handbook, supra n.12, 173, 576–7.

70

03_Altman_Ch02.indd 70

12/2/2011 9:12:46 AM

OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, 12/02/11, NEWGEN

Targeting Co-belligerents
states as co-belligerents of the enemy and thus subject to attack. However, thirdparty states must ﬁrst be given the opportunity to declare their neutrality in the
conﬂict, and only if they refuse to remain neutral can they be declared co-belligerents of the enemy and thereby subject to lawful attack.54 The application of
this doctrine can be quite controversial, in particular whether a state can feign
neutrality and yet oﬀer limited assistance to an ally and remain free from attack.55
This can be referred to as a form of benevolent neutrality, or the idea that a state
may “discriminate” against one side of the conﬂict without necessarily becoming
a full co-belligerent in the conﬂict.56
The deeper problem with the doctrine of co-belligerency is whether it can be successfully transplanted from the original state-based system of public international
law into the new realm of non-state actors like Al Qaeda. Bradley and Goldsmith
have argued that terrorists who are “co-belligerents” of Al Qaeda are by extension
engaged in an armed conﬂict with the United States by virtue of their status as
co-belligerents.57 However, in Al-Bihani, a U.S. federal court rejected application
of the doctrine to the war against Al Qaeda, concluding that the doctrine was
rooted in traditional public international law notions of state sovereignty and that
any “attempt to apply the rules of co-belligerency to such a force would be folly,
akin to this court ascribing powers of national sovereignty to a local chapter of the
Freemasons.”58
Indeed, the law of neutrality is based on the idea that states have a duty to declare
themselves either oﬃcially neutral in a conﬂict or throw their lot in with one
side of the conﬂict over the other—thus sharing the advantages of victory but
also sharing the burdens of defeat. In the words of Francis Lieber, they advance
and retrograde together.59 The problem is that irregular ﬁghting forces are not
similarly situated with their enemies in an analogous fashion to states within
the global Westphalian system.60 All states in the Westphalian system enjoy the
sovereignty associated with the formal equality of nation-states; one expression
of this sovereignty is the ability to form strategic alliances, declare war, engage in
armed conﬂict, sign peace treaties, and return to peaceful relations with an enemy
54

Ibid.
W. Heintschel von Heinegg, ‘ “Benevolent” Third States in International Armed Conﬂict,’
in M. Schmitt and J. Pejic, International Law and Armed Conﬂict: Exploring the Faultlines (Nijhoﬀ
Leiden, 2007) 543–68.
56 Ibid.
57 See Bradley and Goldsmith, “Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism,” supra
n.18, 2112.
58 Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 873 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The issue is also discussed by
Kevin Jon Heller, D.C. Circuit Rejected “Co-Belligerency” in Al-Bihani, opiniojuris.org (October 17,
2010), available at <http://opiniojuris.org/2010/10/17/dc-circuit-rejects-co-belligerency/> accessed
November 4, 2011.
59
US General Order No. 100, April 24, 1863 (the Lieber Code), art. 20.
60
See also L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise (1906) vol. 2, § 74.
55
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state. Non-state actors are neither sovereign entities nor do they enjoy the capacities that ﬂow directly from this sovereignty. Nonetheless, Bradley and Goldsmith
have argued that the U.S. president is permitted to target individual terrorists who
are co-belligerents of Al Qaeda.61 The invocation of the concept of co-belligerency
allows them to connect the individual terrorist with a ﬁghting force that is currently engaged in an armed conﬂict with the United States. They invoke this
rationale to demonstrate that such targeted killings comply with the congressional authorization that was provided to the president in the Authorization for
the Use of Military Force (AUMF) passed after the September 11 attacks.62
The concept of co-belligerency is built around the notion that combatants ﬁghting
against a common enemy—even if they are not ﬁghting on a uniﬁed front—can
be linked together simply by virtue of their common enemy. The old adage that the
enemy of my enemy is my friend best expresses the principle. Simply by virtue of
standing in the common relationship of belligerency against the same enemy, two
entities become co-belligerents.
The key thing to remember about the doctrine of co-belligerency, as it exists in the
law of neutrality, is that it is built around the notion of publicity. Co-belligerents
are not deﬁned simply around their actions on the battleﬁeld. Rather, third-party
states must be allowed the opportunity to publicly declare their neutrality in the
conﬂict, and only if they forgo this opportunity may they be labeled co-belligerents and subject to attack. This publicity criterion works well for sovereign entities
such as states that are capable of exercising foreign relations. It is less clear how this
translates into the domain of individual terrorists who are deﬁned as co-belligerents of Al Qaeda. They are not given the formal opportunity to declare their neutrality, nor are they given a conventional form of notice that they are being declared
a co-belligerent of Al Qaeda, except in the generic sense that the United States
has publicly declared that all militants are subject to attack unless they foreswear
allegiance to Al Qaeda or the Taliban. But this certainly does not meet the formal
requirements of the law of neutrality, nor does it capture its underlying spirit of
publicity.
(c) Military membership
The traditional rules of IHL implicitly rely on a principle of membership in order
to link an individual combatant with a larger ﬁghting force. The basic criteria
for the ﬁghting force—the wearing of a military uniform, the display of a ﬁxed
emblem recognizable at a distance, the carrying of arms openly—deﬁnes the
collective ﬁghting force as a military organization that deserves the protection of
61
Bradley and Goldsmith, “Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism,” supra
n.18, 2113.
62
Ibid.
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IHL.63 However, the basic criteria also help deﬁne the individuals who belong to
the organization. Determining membership is based on the fact that individuals in
the military wear uniforms, display ﬁxed emblems, and carry their arms openly (to
the extent that they use weapons); this in turn publicly signals to the world that the
individual is part of the ﬁghting force.
Membership is important because it provides a public criterion that is comparatively easy to establish.64 The link is established simply by virtue of signing up
with the military, being drafted, or donning a uniform. No deeper investigation is
required. Indeed, it does not even matter if the combatant actually engages in combatancy. His status as a combatant is established simply by virtue of his joining the
military organization, regardless of whether he actually ﬁres his weapon and kills
an enemy soldier.65 The link is easily administered, public, and clear for both sides
of a conﬂict (and even third parties) to identify the relevant individuals. So there is
comparatively little ambiguity about membership in a military organization.
Unfortunately, membership in a terrorist organization does not demonstrate any
of the hallmarks that IHL typically assigns to membership in a military organization.66 Terrorists do not wear uniforms or display ﬁ xed emblems, nor do they
carry arms openly.67 Perﬁdy and deception are essential tools that allow the terrorist to complete his deadly craft. It may be the case that membership in a terrorist organization may have other essential attributes, but they are undeniably not
the same attributes that IHL assigns to military organizations.68 The standard
IHL categories were speciﬁcally designed to link the individual soldier with warring collectives that are the traditional subjects of public international law (that
63 See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12,
1949, opened for signature August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
64 See, e.g., William Bradford, “In the Minds of Men: A Theory of Compliance with the Laws of
War,” 36 Ariz. St. L.J. (2004) 1243, 1269 (identifying transparency as one factor that determines
whether states comply with IHL speciﬁcally and legal regimes generally).
65 But see Fleck, Th e Handbook, supra n. 12, 80 (concluding that members of the armed forces
who do not take direct part in hostilities are non-combatants); Prosecutor v. Halilovic, ICTY Trial
Chamber, No. IT-01-48-T (November 16, 2005) para. 34.
66 See, e.g., Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 725 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d
1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (membership in “command structure” is a suﬃcient but not necessary condition for legal determination that detainee is a member of Al Qaeda). For a discussion, see also John
B. Bellinger III and Vijay M. Padmanabhan, “Detention Operations in Contemporary Conﬂicts:
Four Challenges for the Geneva Conventions and Other Existing Law,” 105 AJIL (2011) 201, 220
(discussing need for workable criteria for detention of unlawful combatants based on their status).
67 Nils Melzer, “Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response
to the Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation
in Hostilities,” 42 NYU Journal of International Law & Politics (2010) 831, 843 (distinguishing
functional from formal concepts of membership).
68 See Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conﬂ ict Research, Harvard University, “IHL and
Civilian Participation in Hostilities in the OPT,” Policy Brief, October 2007, 10 (“The end of membership must be objectively communicated, posing the same intelligence problems as the aﬃrmative disengagement approach above, especially given that many groups may not have oﬃcial rosters
of membership, uniforms, or centralized housing.”).
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is, nation-states), and to provide a ﬁrst gloss on Lieber’s assumption that individual soldiers are linked to the collective such that they advance and retrograde
together. With these criteria, however, the terrorist remains in limbo.
(i) Form vs. function One might solve this problem by moving from a formal
concept of membership to a functional concept of membership.69 Formal membership is built around formal indicia such as membership lists, the wearing of
uniforms, and de jure requirements of domestic law, while the functional concept
of membership can be determined by the individual’s role and function within
the organization.70 For the functional deﬁnition of membership, it is particularly
relevant whether the individual received and carried out orders from the organization’s hierarchy.71 The application of the formal concept of membership, with
its emphasis on de jure considerations, may not map onto the “the more informal
and ﬂuctuating membership structures of irregularly constituted armed forces
ﬁghting on behalf of State and non-State belligerents.”72
In contrast, the functional version of the concept takes that informal structure as
given and determines membership based on the individual’s place within—and
relationship to—that hierarchy, even if that hierarchy is nebulous, irregular, or
constantly shifting. The result is a version of the membership concept that can
actually be applied to terrorist organizations, even if they are ill-deﬁned and lack
the same rigorous structure of state military organizations. Although the functional concept of membership is far less public and transparent than the formal
concept of membership, it retains the essential characteristics of a membership
criterion insofar as it is nominally based on an individual’s status as a member of a
terrorist organization.
(d) Control
One might connect an individual terrorist with Al Qaeda—and the armed conﬂict
between Al Qaeda and the United States—with a control test. Under this view,
the individual is linked to the collective if Al Qaeda “controls” the actions of the
individual. This principle has its genesis in public international law and the standard that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) imposed in the Nicaragua case
to determine whether the actions of an armed group could be attributed to a state
69
See Interpretive Guidance, supra n. 37, 1005 (concluding that membership in military organizations is based on “formal integration into permanent units distinguishable by uniforms, insignia
and equipment” but that membership in irregular groups requires functional criteria).
70
For an example, see Al Waraﬁ v. Obama, 704 F. Supp. 2d 32, 38 (D.D.C. 2010) (functional
approach requires determination that the individual “functioned or participated within or under
the command structure of the Taliban—i.e. whether he received and executed orders or directions”); Hamlily, 616, F. Supp. 2d at 75 (same).
71
Al Waraﬁ v. Obama, 704 F. Supp. 2d 32, 38 (but noting that knowledge and intent is required
and excluding those who “unwittingly become part of the apparatus”).
72
See Melzer, “Keeping the Balance,” supra n.67, 845 (defending relevance of functional criteria
for membership).
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for purposes of assigning state responsibility for the group’s actions.73 The court
concluded that state responsibility existed in cases of eﬀective control of the group’s
actions. In Nicaragua, the United States was found not be in control of the contras
because, although the US was found to be involved in “planning, direction and support” of the contras’ paramilitary activities, there was insuﬃcient evidence that the
United States “directed or enforced the perpetuation of the acts contrary to human
rights and humanitarian law alleged by the applicant State.”74
There are other versions of the control principle. The International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) famously rejected the ICJ’s eﬀective control test
and formulated a diﬀerent standard based on overall control.75 Under this new
standard, control by the state requires more than mere ﬁnancing or providing military equipment, but the standard stops short of the strict standard imposed by the
ICJ. The overall control standard is met by the planning and supervision of military
activities in general, without requiring that the planning or oversight extend down to
the level of speciﬁc military attacks.76 A more general level of planning or supervision
can constitute overall control of the paramilitary organization even in the absence of
speciﬁcally directing the organization’s military operations.
The problem with borrowing either of these control principles and applying
them to the War on Terror is that many of the individuals who are targeted
by the Administration are not controlled by Al Qaeda, even under the looser
version of the standard articulated by the ICTY. In some cases, to be sure,
the individual’s activities may indeed be directed by Al Qaeda. In other situations, however, the individual will be aﬃ liated with a regional terrorist organization with very loose ties to the Al Qaeda parent group. Originally, Al Qaeda
represented a deﬁ ned organization with speciﬁc individuals committed to a
particular political objective. But the organization has now transformed into
a looser confederation of like-minded fellow travelers, many of whom are ﬁghting separate armed conﬂ icts in diﬀerent regions of the globe. These conﬂ icts
include diﬀerent enemies, diﬀerent objectives, and diﬀerent techniques, though
they might share an overarching ideological commitment to violent jihadism.
Consequently, in many situations, the parent organization may provide ideological and rhetorical support but no direct or even general operational control
over the local terrorist organization.
One solution to this problem is to redeﬁne the armed conﬂict as not against Al
Qaeda per se but rather the long list of more local organizations that are engaged
73 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), June
27, 1986, ICJ Reports (1986).
74
Ibid. at 64–5 (emphasis added).
75
See Prosecutor v. Tadic, ICTY Appeals Chamber, Case No. IT-94-1-A, para. 137.
76
Ibid.
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in terrorist activities.77 Th is might alleviate the need to use the control principle
in the ﬁrst place, but the strategy can only be imperfectly applied. To the extent
that a pre-existing local organization is involved in a bona ﬁde armed conﬂict
with the United States, the strategy works. However, many of these sub-groups
might be so localized that they could not be said to be engaged in a declared
armed conﬂict with the United States. Furthermore, some of these local groups
might be so loosely organized that even the local group does not “control”—
either eﬀectively or overall—the actions of the individual terrorist.
(e) Complicity and conspiracy
Another solution is to import the doctrine of complicity from the domain of criminal law as a way of linking the individual terrorist to a larger group engaged in
armed conﬂict with the United States. The doctrine of complicity implicitly relies
on a causal notion, in the sense that complicity liability is generated by an individual’s contribution (or attempted contribution) to a criminal endeavor, just as
long as the contribution makes the completion of the crime more likely.78 This broad
notion of complicity has increasingly been used as a paradigm to understand an
individual’s contribution to a national collective endeavor of war-making.79 The
importation of a criminal law notion into the domain of public international law
may, at ﬁrst glance, appear strange, but the concept’s intuitive appeal is undeniable.
At ﬁrst glance, the only diﬀerence between the classical criminal law situation and
the situation of a national armed struggle is the size of the collective endeavor to
which the contribution is made.80 The other side of the equation—the individual,
as well as his relationship to the collective—remains the same. Furthermore, the
case under consideration here (the individual contributing to the collective terrorist
organization) stands in between the classical criminal law paradigm and the statebased paradigm of international conﬂicts inherent in public international law. This
broad notion of complicity in a collective endeavor is also encoded in Article 25(3)
(d) of the Rome Statute, which scholars have interpreted as criminalizing a form of
residual complicity in a collective criminal endeavor.81 Although terrorism is not a
discrete international crime under the Rome Statute, the mode of liability codiﬁed
in Article 25(3)(d) represents a similar invocation of the concept of complicity in
77
The concept of the “War on Terror” represents an even wider solution, where the enemy is terrorism itself. However, this is just as nonsensical as declaring a War on War or a War on Enemies,
with the opponent being deﬁned as anyone who threatens aggressive action. This eviscerates the
notion of an armed conﬂict against a deﬁned enemy.
78
Compare Sanford H. Kadish, “Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation
of Doctrine,” 73 California Law Review (1985) 323, 343 and John Gardner, “Complicity and
Causality,” 1 Criminal Law and Philosophy (2007) 127, with Christopher Kutz, “Causeless
Complicity,” I Criminal Law And Philosophy (2007) 289.
79
See, e.g., Christopher Kutz, “The Diﬀerence Uniforms Make: Collective Violence in Criminal
Law and the Law of War,” 33 Philosophy and Public Aﬀ airs (2005) 148.
80
Cf. ibid. at 153.
81
The provision was interpreted by the ICC in Lubanga, ¶ 337.
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group action. The federal crime of providing material support for terrorism is also
built around the notion of complicity.82
The causal element of criminal complicity picks up quite nicely the causal interpretation of directly participating in hostilities. Under this view, it makes sense
to target individual terrorists who are complicit in the larger collective conﬂict
(whether one deﬁnes the conﬂict as a criminal conﬂict or a war) because complicity
represents a form of participation. In criminal law, this point is purely deﬁnitional;
complicity is deﬁned as a form of participation in criminal wrongdoing.83 A party
to an armed conﬂict has every reason to target an individual whose actions contribute to—or were aimed at contributing to—their eventual defeat.
The question, however, is whether the causal element of criminal complicity
is suﬃciently direct as a linking principle to adequately serve as a gloss on the
notion of directly participating in hostilities. Indeed, criminal law scholars
often describe aiders and abettors—and other form of accomplices—as having engaged in a form of indirect commission of the crime. 84 True, at least some
accomplices could be described as direct participants in the endeavor, but the
criterion of complicity is notoriously broad and meant to capture a wider scope
of participation that plays some causal role in the criminal endeavor, even if that
causal role is somewhat attenuated. Even in criminal law, though, the causal
role cannot be too attenuated; otherwise criminal liability is usually denied as
inappropriate. But even still, the criminal law notion may capture a whole host
of individuals whose indirect contributions to the endeavor make them criminally culpable (and hence subject to punishment) but perhaps not subject to the
immediate and summary killing implicit in traditional combatancy under the
standard rules of IHL.
One might attempt to tighten the complicity link by switching to the concept of
conspiracy.85 Conspiracy as a mode of liability is arguably stricter than complicity,
because it requires an underlying agreement between the individual and the associated individuals.86 As applied to the terrorist, he would be linked to the terrorist
organization because he has jointly agreed with other terrorists to pursue an armed
struggle against the United States. Individuals who merely contribute to the cause,
82 See Norman Abrams, “The Material Support Terrorism Oﬀenses: Perspectives Derived from
the (Early) Model Penal Code,” 1 Journal of National Security Law and Policy (2005) 5.
83 See George P. Fletcher, “Complicity,” 30 Israel Law Review (1996) 140.
84 Th is is also sometimes described as perpetration-by-means. See Rome Statute, art. 25(3)(a).
See also MPC §2.06. For a discussion, see F. Jessberger, “On the Application of a Theory of Indirect
Perpetration in Al Bashir: German Doctrine at The Hague?,” 6 Journal of International Criminal
Justice (2008) 853.
85 Conspiracy as a mode of liability is sometimes viewed as a separate doctrine from complicity,
and occasionally as a subcategory of complicity (with accomplice liability being the other subcategory). This ambiguity is immaterial for our purposes here.
86
18 U.S.C. §371.
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without an underlying agreement for joint action, would not be linked to the collective under the conspiracy doctrine.87
It makes sense to view terrorism through the lens of conspiracy. Terrorists pursue
an unlawful objective through conspiratorial means: agreeing to a course of action,
collective pursuit of common goals, secret and underground deliberations.88
Moreover, the entire rationale of the conspiracy doctrine was to create an inchoate oﬀence of preparation for criminality that allows the authorities to intervene
quickly in a burgeoning criminal endeavor. Whatever public policy rationale exists
for intervening in domestic criminal conspiracies applies with equal or greater
force to transnational conspiracies to commit acts of terrorism.
Having sketched out the terrain of possible linking principles, our task is now to
evaluate their comparative strengths and weaknesses, both from the perspective
of positive law (for example, support in treaty or customary law) as well as compliance with the underlying normative principles of international law. That being
said, this investigation cannot prejudge the correct paradigm, that is, whether
the most appropriate normative principles are those underlying the law enforcement paradigm or the law of war paradigm, or a combination of both. Section
IV will pursue this goal by pursuing a comparative evaluation of the linking
principles.
IV. A comparative evaluation of the linking principles
When can an individual be linked to a collective group for purposes of being
selected for a targeted killing? A comparative analysis of the linking principles
reveals that an individual can be linked either through status alone or by virtue of a
more discrete action. So membership in a military organization, by virtue of wearing a uniform or displaying a ﬁxed symbol, confers a status on the individual that
links him to the collective ﬁghting force. Similarly, the concept of co-belligerency
from the law of neutrality involves a status-like element by virtue of a belligerent’s
refusal to declare itself neutral in a conﬂict.
It should come as no surprise that IHL relies on the linking principle of membership in a military organization, given how much is at stake. If individuals are
linked for purposes of IHL, they gain the privilege of combatant immunity as
well as opening themselves to the risk of reciprocal killing. Individuals who meet
these criteria know that they meet these criteria, and moreover, their enemies
know this as well. In fact, the public nature of the linking principle is internal to
the principle itself, because the link is built around the criteria of uniforms, ﬁ xed
emblems, and weaponry—all of which are designed to publicly convey to one’s
87

However, they would be guilty of providing material support.
On this point, see generally J.D. Ohlin, “Group Think: The Law of Conspiracy and Collective
Reason,” 98 J. Criminal Law and Criminology (2007) 147, 201.
88
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enemy that the linking principle is fulﬁ lled. When so much is at stake, it makes
sense for the linking principle to be self-publicizing and self-applying.
In contrast, the criminal law notions of conspiracy and complicity are causal criteria that are far less public. The individual’s actions that link him to the collective
are hardly public at all, because the actions of the terrorist are usually conducted
covertly, far from the prying eyes of the enemy. Terrorists are more like spies than
traditional combatants. Furthermore, the criteria for conspiracy or complicity are
usually complicated and require the testing and fact-ﬁnding process that dominates the criminal trial. Allowing criminal law concepts to function as a linking
principle cuts against the underlying nature of IHL, which necessarily relies on
easy-to-administer criteria in the absence of a judicial system.
In light of this insight, section IV(a) will reconsider the virtues of membership as
a linking principle, even though criminal law scholars have given it a bad name.
Section IV(b) will then consider an updated version of the membership concept—
the continuous combat function—that avoids many of the anxieties that criminal
law scholars have about membership principles. Finally, section IV(c) will compare status and conduct principles and demonstrate that membership principles
can be modiﬁed into a “functional membership” concept that represents a hybrid
between status and conduct. The result is a legally defensible and philosophically
coherent principle to link suspected terrorists with the non-state organizations that
are ﬁghting the United States.
(a) Rethinking membership
We are therefore caught between two types of linking principles. The traditional
IHL linking principles are both self-applying and public. The traditional criminal
law linking principles are neither self-applying nor public, since they require a
comparatively larger degree of fact-ﬁnding to determine if their standards are met.
At which end of the spectrum should we place targeted killings? Should targeted
individuals be linked with the underlying principles of IHL or the criminal law?
Functionally, targeted killings are much closer to the summary killings that
are inherent to IHL on the battleﬁeld. Although the criminal law concepts of
conspiracy and complicity cast a wide net, this looseness is mitigated by the fact
that the criminal law system aﬀords defendants a chance to contest the causal
linkage before a neutral decision-maker. 89 No such right exists on the battleﬁeld,
which is precisely why the linking principles used by IHL are much narrower.90
Although many individuals might be causally responsible for helping the war
89

See generally Larry May, Global Justice and Due Process (Cambridge University Press, 2011)

117.
90
Cf. Richard Murphy and Afsheen John Radsan, “Due Process and the Targeted Killing of
Terrorists,” 31 Cardozo Law Review (2009) 405, 409; May, Global Justice and Due Process, supra n.
89, 154.
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eﬀort, the rules of IHL limit automatic killing to soldiers in uniform (and civilians directly participating in hostilities). Although this classiﬁcation might be
seriously limited, the whole structure of IHL is built around the notion that the
reciprocal risk of killing should be underbroad rather than overbroad, precisely
because there is no opportunity to contest a determination on the battleﬁeld. The
uniformed soldier on the battleﬁeld cannot complain that he was killed before he
could contest his status, because he was wearing a uniform.
(i) A functional equivalent Targeted killings represent the same kind of summary killing that traditional combatants face on the battleﬁeld. While conspiracy
and complicity are strict enough for a system with a criminal process, they are not
appropriate for summary execution outside of the judicial process. This suggests
that however we link individuals to a collective for purposes of targeted killing,
it ought to be with a linking principle that is closer to the IHL linking principles
rather than criminal law linking principles. The correct linking principle would
represent a functional equivalent to the IHL linking principle that governs the
targeting of traditional combatants. The diﬀerence would be that the functional
equivalent ought to be tailored for the speciﬁcs of the situation: a non-state group
composed of individuals who pursue terrorism without a uniform.
Although it is diﬃcult to sketch out the exact contours of this hypothetical linking
principle, it ought to lie somewhere between the doctrine of co-belligerency and
membership in a military organization. The doctrine of co-belligerency, as understood by the law of neutrality, has the advantage that it is based on both publicity
and self-declared consent; the co-belligerent nation publicly refuses to aﬃrm its
neutrality and is therefore declared a co-belligerent. The very same publicity and
self-declared consent is performed by the individual soldier who dons a uniform.
Both are then subject to summary attack under the laws of war, though one norm
ﬂows from jus ad bellum and the other ﬂows from jus in bello. But the structure of
both is remarkably similar.
The functional equivalent in cases of targeted killings would link the individual to the collective terrorist group if the individual is a card-carrying member of a terrorist organization or a self-declared enemy of the United States.91
Membership might be established in a number of ways, not simply by attending
an Al Qaeda training camp.92 We are therefore left with the following linking
91
In his UN report, Philip Alston denies that membership alone can be suﬃcient to identify
a terrorist as an appropriate target for a killing. See U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the
Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Addendum: Study on Targeted
Killings, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) paras 65–6 (criticizing the ICRC standard of “continuous combat function” for its overreliance on membership and other status-based
concepts). For a complete discussion of the ICRC notion of the continuous combat function, see
infra section IV(b).
92
Although in many cases, prosecution is based precisely on attendance at a training camp. See,
e.g., United States v. Hassoun, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85684 (D. Fla. 2007).
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principle: voluntary membership in an organization engaged in an armed conﬂict
with the United States.93 his linking principle might at ﬁrst glance sound too narrow, because terrorists might opportunistically avoid declaring their allegiances
in order to avoid being targeted—an example of lawfare to be sure. But the anxiety is misplaced. The very concept of terrorism hinges on publicity—publicity for
a cause and a political objective, neither of which can be easily disowned without
doing damage to the theater of violence implicit in terrorist attacks.94
(ii) The transitory requirement This conclusion is more than just normativephilosophical. It is also a legal conclusion, in the sense that it can be understood
as a gloss on the concept of direct participation in hostilities, the original requirement of jus in bello that explains when a civilian loses his or her protected status
under IHL. On this point, one might object that this understanding—direct
participation in hostilities in terms of self-declared membership in an organization engaged in an armed conﬂict with the United States—conﬂicts with another
aspect of the “direct participation” linking principle. The Optional Protocol withdraws protection from civilians “for such time” as they are directly participating
in hostilities.95 The ﬂexible and temporal work performed by the concept of “for
such time” suggests that the associated status (protected civilian vs. unprotected
combatant) shifts constantly depending on the actions of the particular individual. He can fall in and out of protection at each moment in time, depending
on his conduct—without a reiﬁed status that endures throughout the individual’s
existence. This approach was famously discussed by the Israeli Supreme Court in
its Targeted Killings decision.96
Is this transitory requirement of the Optional Protocol consistent with membership
in an organization engaged in an armed conﬂict with the United States? Or is the
latter far too status-oriented—that is, not suﬃciently transitory and ﬂexible—to
accord with the “for such time” standard?97 It strikes me that the notion of selfdeclared membership is, in fact, consistent with the transitory nature of the “for
such time” standard. Individuals join and leave organizations all the time—just as
93 For a discussion, see Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conﬂ ict Research, Harvard
University, IHL and Civilian Participation in Hostilities in the OPT, October 2007, 10 (comparing
“membership approach” with “limited membership approach” that restricts targeting to ﬁghting
members of armed groups).
94 Fletcher, “The Indeﬁ nable Concept of Terrorism,” supra n.10, 909.
95 See Additional Protocol I, supra n. 23, 174, art. 51(3).
96 Public Committee Against Torture v. Israel (“Targeted Killings Case”), HCJ 769/02 (2005).
97 The “for such time” requirement is the subject of some controversy. Compare Bill Boothby,
“ ‘And for such time as’: The Time Dimension to Direct Participation in Hostilities,” 42 NYU
Journal of International Law & Politics (2010) 741, 764–5 (questioning the customary status of the
norm and suggesting that the “for such time” requirement is limited to treaty signatories of the
Additional Protocol), with Melzer, “Keeping the Balance,” supra n. 67, 884–5 (stating that treaty
is binding on 169 states and noting that even the Israeli High Court believes that the additional
protocol requirement codiﬁes customary law).
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they join and leave criminal conspiracies—and such decisions are both legally and
morally signiﬁcant. The individual terrorist is subject to the risk of being killed “for
such time” as he is a member of Al Qaeda, though he regains the core protections
of IHL if and when he permanently leaves Al Qaeda. At that moment in time he
becomes a subject of the criminal process again. This solution avoids some of the
most perverse aspects of the revolving door problem, that is, the risk that terrorists
will launch terrorist attacks but fall back into civilian status to shield themselves
from the enemy.98 If the “for such time” criterion is linked to membership in the
organization, such opportunistic shifts are dramatically more diﬃcult.
(b) The continuous combat function standard
Th is membership principle is arguably what the ICRC was getting at in its
Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation, which explicitly
recognized the signiﬁcance of engaging in a continuous combat function.99
According to the Interpretative Guidance, membership in an armed group of a
non-state party to a non-international armed conﬂ ict depends on whether the
individual engages in a “continuous combat function.”100 The point of introducing the new continuous combat function criterion is to distinguish between,
on the one hand, “members of the organized ﬁghting forces of a non-State party
from civilians who directly participate in hostilities on a merely spontaneous,
sporadic, or unorganized basis, or who assume exclusively political, administrative or other non-combat functions.”101 The functional consequence of this distinction is to carve out a category under IHL that treats soldiers in a non-state
military organization in analogous fashion (for example, according to membership) to soldiers in a more traditional state-party military organization.
How is this distinction to be made? An individual is deemed to be engaged
in a continuous combat function, as opposed to the more transitory and ﬂeeting direct participation in hostilities, if their “continuous function involves the
preparation, execution, or command of acts or operations amounting to direct
participation in hostilities are assuming a continuous combat function. An individual recruited, trained and equipped by such a group to continuously and
directly participate in hostilities on its behalf can be considered to assume a continuous combat function even before he or she ﬁrst carries out a hostile act.”102
98
Targeted Killings Case, supra n.96, para. 40 (discussing problem of revolving door and citing
1 Kings 1:50 and Numbers 35:11).
99
See Interpretative Guidance, supra n. 37, 991, 1007–9. The document’s principal author was
Nils Melzer, ICRC Legal Advisor, and was adopted by the Assembly of the International Committee
of the Red Cross on February 26, 2009.
100
Ibid. 1007 (“membership must depend on whether the continuous function assumed by an
individual corresponds to that collectively exercised by the group as a whole, namely the conduct of
hostilities on behalf of a non-State party to the conﬂict”).
101
Ibid.
102
Ibid. at 1007–8.
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If one applies this standard to Al Qaeda, there is a plausible argument that these
terrorists are trained to continuously operate as terrorists with the goal of pursuing attacks against the United States and its allies. Moreover, there is a lasting
integration of the individual into the collective, on whose behalf the individual is
acting.103 Although many of these members have not yet ﬁnalized an attack, they
are engaged in the process of preparing, planning, or training for an attack. Their
status as Al Qaeda terrorists therefore makes them subject to military attack.
The ICRC standard of engaging in a continuous combat function was (and
remains) highly controversial when it was adopted by the Red Cross working
group.104 Some scholars disapproved of the membership-oriented nature of the
concept and believed that the concept of direct participation in hostilities ought
to remain transitory and based solely on the actions of the individual at each
moment in time.105 Furthermore, these scholars rejected the rationale that armed
groups of a non-state party to an armed conﬂict ought to have a functional analogue to membership in a state’s military organization.106 On the other hand,
other scholars, including some who participated in the ICRC working group
that developed the continuous combat function standard, criticized the proposal
from the opposite direction, that is, sacriﬁcing the principle of military necessity
for the principle of humanity.107 These criticisms were a natural outgrowth of a
pre-existing anxiety about how IHL treats organized armed groups diﬀerently
depending on whether they are a state party or not. Members of a non-state
armed organization receive the added protection of the “for such time” limitation (and are consequently immune from targeting part of the time), while members of a state party’s military organization are subject to attack purely on the
basis of membership.108 Why should members of a non-state armed organization
receive more protection under the customary rules of IHL, rather than less?
The continuous combat function standard was meant to be a solution to that
problem. In fact, the ICRC Interpretative Guidelines apply the continuous combat
function criterion both to non-international armed conﬂicts and international
103 Ibid. at 1007 (discussing lasting integration in an organized armed group as a requirement of
the continuous combat function standard).
104 See Mezler, “Keeping the Balance,” supra n. 67, 831, 834.
105 Ibid. at 835.
106 Ibid. (“while Schmitt contends that the Interpretive Guidance’s deﬁ nition of ‘direct participation in hostilities’ is too restrictive, essentially because it excludes support activities not directly
causing harm to the enemy, other experts would criticize the Guidance’s deﬁnition as too generous
because, in certain circumstances, it might allow the targeting of civilians who do not pose an
immediate threat to the enemy.”).
107 See, e.g., Kenneth Watkin, “Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed Groups and the ICRC
‘Direct Participation in the Hostilities’ Interpretive Guidance,” 42 NYU Journal of International
Law & Politics (2010) 641.
108
Compare Watkin, “Opportunity Lost” supra n.107, 644, with Melzer, “Keeping the Balance,”
supra n.67, 851.
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armed conﬂicts, such that membership is limited to those individuals who display
a continuous combat function as opposed to those who, like reservists, have a
combat function that is “spontaneous, sporadic, or temporary” or “assume exclusively political, administrative or other non-combat functions”109 The problem
with the ICRC’s particular proposal is that it did not go far enough. According to
at least some scholars, the requirement set up a diﬀerent legal regime that provided
an unfair and unwarranted advantage to insurgent groups.110 Only members of
an organized armed group who evidence a continuous combat function could be
lawfully targeted; all other members of the group can only be targeted for such
time as they are directly participating in hostilities. By contrast, all members of a
state’s military apparatus are subject to lawfully targeting, even a cook, regardless
of whether they are directly participating in hostilities or not.111 From the point
of view of this criticism, the proper remedy is to normalize the standard across all
armed groups, whether state actors or non-state actors. In other words, membership in both domains could be limited to those who display a continuous combat
function or, in the alternative, membership in both domains could be expanded
to all individuals and include the proverbial cook in both the state military and
the insurgent group, so as to eliminate the unfair advantage conferred on the
insurgents.112 This the Red Cross proposal does not do.
However, even if one sticks with the Red Cross proposal and applies the continuous
combat function requirement just to insurgents, it may be the case that some insurgent groups are so entirely focused on planning and perpetrating military attacks
that every member of the group is engaged in a continuous combat function.113
109

ICRC Interpretative Guidance, supra n. 37, 1007.
See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, “The Interpretative Guidance on Direct Participation in
Hostilities: A Critical Analysis,” Harvard National Security Journal (2010) 5, 23. See also Adam
Roberts, “The Equal Application of the Laws of War: A Principle Under Pressure,” 90 International
Review of the Red Cross (2008) 931.
111 Schmitt, “The Interpretative Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities: A Critical
Analysis,” supra n. 110, 23. Melzer contends that the asymmetry is justiﬁed because even cooks
in a traditional army “are not only entitled, but also trained, armed, and expected to directly participate in hostilities in case of enemy contact and, therefore, also assume a continuous combat
function.” See Melzer, “Keeping the Balance,” supra n. 67, 852. The ICTY apparently disagrees.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Halilovic, No. IT-01-48-T (November 16, 2005) para. 34 (noting that while
“membership of the armed forces can be a strong indication that the victim is directly participating
in the hostilities, it is not an indicator which in and of itself is suﬃcient”). However, the only two
counter-examples oﬀered by the ICTY Trial Chamber include non-mobilized reservists and civilian
police oﬃcers incorporated de jure into the armed forces by domestic statute. Ibid., para. 34 n.78.
For a brief discussion, see Ryan Goodman, “The Detention of Civilians in Armed Conﬂict,” 103
AJIL (2009) 48, n.41.
112
But see Melzer, “Keeping the Balance,” supra n.67, 851.
113
For a discussion of the ambiguity in applying this criterion in these situations, compare
Schmitt, “Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements”, supra
n.50, 727 (noting diﬃculty with deﬁning “capacity building” activities such as recruitment of suicide bombers, procurement of materials, and assembly and storage of explosives), with Melzer,
“Keeping the Balance,” supra n. 67, 865–6 (“whether an act constitutes a measure preparatory or
110
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The U.S. administration has taken a similar view in habeas corpus proceedings
in federal court arising out of Guantanamo Bay detentions.114 According to the
Obama Administration, Al Qaeda is a military organization through-and-through,
such that all members of the group are dedicated to planning, supporting, or executing future attacks in some way or another.115 Unlike other insurgent armed groups
that also perform some political or civilian functions (for example, Hamas in Gaza
or the Taliban in Afghanistan),116 Al Qaeda exists solely to plot terrorist attacks
against designated targets; it has no positive political program of its own nor does it
aspire to directly control territory through the operation of an Al Qaeda syndicate
government. Is it therefore possible that all members of Al Qaeda and similar groups
are engaged in a continuous combat function in some way or another?
(c) Status rules vs. conduct rules
Whether one accepts this argument or not, the real point is to emphasize that
the entire discussion of the continuous combat function requirement takes place
within the general context of membership as a linking principle. As good criminal law scholars, we are supposed to favor conduct rules over outcomes based on
status alone. As criminal law professors we assign our students Martin v. State
and drive home the proposition that the principle of culpability requires that
we punish individuals solely for their blameworthy actions, not their status.117
Th is argument is particularly relevant for the War on Terror, where the government arguably uses status to determine who should be declared an unlawful
combatant, interned at Guantanamo Bay, tried before a military commission,
or even summarily killed by a drone attack.118 To some critics, this represents an
unwarranted infringement on civil liberties in order to protect national security. Under this view, if draconian consequences are required to protect our
nation, they should only be visited upon an individual suspect if he has engaged

otherwise integral to a speciﬁc hostile act or operation, or whether it remains limited to general
capacity-building, must be determined separately for each case, and it is clear that the same objective criteria must apply to all civilians, regardless of whether they happen to support an unsophisticated insurgency or a technologically advanced State.”).
114 I am indebted to Marty Lederman on this point.
115 See, e.g., Al Bihani v. Obama, 594 F. Supp. 2d 35, 39–40 (concluding that despite petitioner’s
contention that he was only a cook, he was also carrying a riﬂe and ammunition and taking orders
from an Al Qaeda military commander).
116 See Schmitt, “The Interpretative Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities: A Critical
Analysis,” supra n.110, 23 (noting that Hamas and Hezbollah have political or social wings but also
concluding that “while membership in an organized armed group can be uncertain, it may also be
irrefutable”).
117 Martin v. State, 31 Ala. App. 334, 17 So. 2d 427 (Alabama 1944); Robinson v. California
(status of being a drug addict). But see Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (upholding public
intoxication statute),
118
See, e.g., Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, (D.D.C. 2009) (status determination of
membership is consistent with international laws of war)

85

03_Altman_Ch02.indd 85

12/2/2011 9:12:48 AM

OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, 12/02/11, NEWGEN

Targeted Killings
in proscribed conduct. Anything less represents a fundamental betrayal of the
civil liberties enshrined in our constitutional structure.
However, the interplay between conduct and status is rich and complex and not so
black and white. Status is often a shortcut for a history of repeated conduct, such
that the status of being a drug addict or the status of appearing drunk in public
are both, with limited exceptions,119 the product of component actions (consuming alcohol or drugs) that we would naturally classify as conduct. Similarly, the
building blocks of IHL demonstrate a complex relationship between conduct and
status. Although membership in a military organization is usually described as a
status, once one inquires about how this status is determined, one learns that the
component requirements are wearing a uniform, the display of a ﬁxed emblem recognizable at a distance, and the carrying of arms openly—all examples of conduct
par excellence.120 It is rare, then, to have a case of status all the way down.
(i) Functional membership as a hybrid concept This is even more true when
one considers a functional version of the concept of membership, which looks
to the individual’s relationship to an organizational hierarchy and whether he
receives and carries out orders from that command structure.121 Unlike a formal
version of membership, which relies more heavily on status criteria, the functional concept is half way on the road to a conduct rule. It relies on the status
concept of membership but cashes out that standard by reference to what the
individual is actually doing—not necessarily at each discrete moment in time,
but rather from the broader perspective of a longer time period: taking orders
from commanders, engaging in military operations at the behest of commanders, etc.122 In fact, one might describe the functional version of membership as
a hybrid concept that straddles the distinction between status and conduct—an
appropriate result for the context of terrorist organizations and other irregular
119 There are a few examples of status categories that are not reducible to an individual’s own
actions, such as an infant drug addict who suﬀered from fetal intoxication in utero. In that case, the
individual’s status is causally reducible to an individual action, but it is someone else’s action—the
parent.
120
Melzer’s defense of the ICRC Interpretative Guidance appears to be insensitive to this dynamic
relationship. e.g., Melzer argues that the asymmetry between state military organizations and nonstate armed groups is justiﬁed because “members of regular State armed forces are legitimate military targets not because of the ‘functions they perform’ but because of their formal status as regular
combatants.” See Melzer, “Keeping the Balance,” supra n.67, 851. This means that membership
can either be based on “formal de jure integration” (for regular armed forces) or on “function de
facto performed,” i.e. conduct (for irregular forces). Ibid. But at some level, even the formal de jure
integration of the armed forces must be based, in part, on their conduct, as he implicitly recognizes
when he points out that even cooks in the regular armed forces are always trained in basic combat
functions.
121
See supra section III(c)(i) for a complete discussion of formal vs. functional membership.
122
See, e.g., Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 872–3 (functional membership based on
“accompanying the brigade on the battleﬁeld, carrying a brigade-issued weapon, cooking for the
unit, and retreating and surrendering under brigade orders” even “in the absence of an oﬃcial
membership card”).
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armed groups. The result is hardly Solomonic; rather, it merges the best of both
worlds.
That being said, it would be an exaggeration to say that the distinction between
conduct and status is wholly illusory. There is a fundamental diﬀerence between
them, albeit one that is often obscured. A status usually represents a proxy for
lower-level conduct. Proxies usually get a bad name in both law and philosophy,
because it is natural to presume that if the lower-level facts generate the moral
or legal signiﬁcance, one ought to eliminate the higher-level proxy and deal
exclusively with the lower-level elements. Under this view, the identiﬁcation
of a proxy suggests eliminativism as the proper course of action. Th is is a hasty
conclusion because one ought to distinguish between crude proxies and successful proxies. Crude proxies take a rough set of intuitions and create a shortcut
that obscures the real signiﬁcance of the underlying elements; what is gained in
administrability and convenience is outweighed by the loss of accuracy.123 By
contrast, successful proxies link together a diverse set of lower-level elements,
solve evidentiary problems, and help root out inconsistencies.124 The question is
whether the status concept under consideration in this chapter—membership
in a terrorist organization engaged in a self-declared armed conﬂ ict—is the
former or the latter.
There is a plausible argument that the status concept that we have deployed
here illuminates more than it obscures. First, it has obvious evidentiary value.
Self-declared membership in an organized armed group is public and transparent; those who join a group dedicated to jihad can understand the position of
conﬂ ict that they have placed themselves in. Second, third parties can monitor
compliance with this norm with relative ease. By contrast, limiting targetability based on the conduct of the targeted individual at each cardinal moment
in time is comparatively less transparent and very diﬃcult for third parties to
monitor. These are precisely the considerations that originally sparked the use of
status concepts such as membership in traditional IHL norms.125

123 Cf. Felix S. Cohen, “Transcendental Nonsense and the Functionalist Approach,” 35 Colum.
L. Rev. (1935) 809 (disparaging the legal utility of metaphysical concepts that have no precise
meaning).
124 Similarly, see Jeremy Waldron, “ ‘Transcendental Nonsense’ and System in the Law,” 100
Colum. L. Rev. (2000) 16 (concluding that metaphysical concepts in the law provide meaningful
explanations when their explanatory circle is suﬃciently large). See also Jens David Ohlin, “Is the
Concept of the Person Necessary for Human Rights?,” 105 Colum. L. Rev. (2005) 209 (invoking
Cohen and Waldron and concluding that metaphysical concepts often link together diverse propositions to promote coherence and root out inconsistencies in doctrine).
125 See Robert Chesney and Jack Goldsmith, “Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and
Military Detention Models,” 60 Stan. L. Rev. (2008) 1079, 1084 (“The laws of war traditionally
emphasize pure associational status as the primary ground for detention; individual conduct provides only a secondary, alternative predicate.”).
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(ii) Preserving civil liberties We are left, then, with a somewhat surprising
result. The traditional dichotomy of national security vs. civil liberties turns out to
be illusory.126 When viewed through the lens of domestic criminal law, the use of
status concepts appears to threaten the principle of culpability and suggests that
the proposed scheme impermissibility infringes civil liberties. But when viewed
through the lens of IHL, the use of status concepts reveals itself to be entirely consistent with the conceptual structure of IHL—a structure that is based largely on
status concepts, and for good reason. To insist yet again that pure conduct alone
should determine targetability is to import criminal law linking principles into a
legal terrain—the battleﬁeld—where the preferred linking principles are publicly
observable and self-administering status concepts such as membership. Moreover,
shifting to a hybrid status-conduct concept such as functional membership goes
even further towards ensuring that truly innocent civilians fall outside the scope
of legitimate targets.
How could this standard be administered? One might object that it is diﬃcult—if not impossible—to prove that any given individual is truly a member
of a terrorist organization engaged in an armed conﬂict with the United States.
After a targeted killing, who is to say that the killing did not live up to this standard? There are two important answers here. Such problems of proof are endemic
to all IHL norms governing civilians, and the current problem will be comparatively easier to administer when compared against a more transitory revolving
door scheme. Second, the concept of joining and leaving a criminal organization
is well worked out in the literature and case law on conspiracies, which in some
jurisdictions imposes stringent requirements on individuals seeking to leave
a criminal organization and escape the consequences of their membership.127
These standards sometimes require a public repudiation of the enterprise—either to the leaders of the enterprise or to the relevant authorities.128 Th is is a high
standard to meet, and appropriately so in the case of domestic criminal law.129
Applied to terrorists, the standard would require a public declaration repudiating
the armed conﬂict against the United States before they could regain their protected

126 Cf. S. Macdonald, “Why we Should Abandon the Balance Metaphor,” 15 ILSA J. International
& Comparative Law (2008–2009) 95.
127 Compare Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912) with United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co.,
438 U.S. 422, 464–5 (1978) (“Aﬃrmative acts inconsistent with the object of the conspiracy and
communicated in a manner reasonably calculated to reach co-conspirators have generally been
regarded as suﬃcient to establish withdrawal or abandonment.”).
128 See, e.g., Al Ginco v. Obama, 626 F. Supp. 2d 123, 128 (D.D.C. 2009) (“prior relationship
[with] al Qaeda . . . can be suﬃciently vitiated by the passage of time, intervening events, or both”).
See also Eldredge v. United States, 62 F.2d 449, 451 (10th Cir. 1932) (conspiracy).
129
See, e.g., ICRC Interpretive Guidance, supra n. 37, 1008 (“In practice, the principle of distinction must be applied based on information which is practically available and can reasonably be
regarded as reliable in the prevailing circumstances.”).

88

03_Altman_Ch02.indd 88

12/2/2011 9:12:48 AM

OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, 12/02/11, NEWGEN

Targeting Co-belligerents
status.130 It is unlikely that any jihadist terrorist would opportunistically exploit this
standard in order to falsely gain protected status. Even despite this fact, however,
there are strong reasons to defend a modiﬁed standard for abandonment. Given
that the criteria for membership is our previously identiﬁed hybrid concept of functional membership, abandonment or renunciation would be demonstrated by the
continued non-existence, for a sustained period of time, of the very factors that led
to the ﬁnding of functional membership in the ﬁrst instance. If, for example, the
individual no longer receives and carries out orders from the command hierarchy,
this would necessarily entail that the individual is no longer a functional member
of the terrorist organization. With this caveat, then, the hybrid concept should oﬀer
bona ﬁde comfort to civil libertarians committed to conduct rules.

V. Conclusion
This new standard has the virtue that it avoids the “revolving door” problem noted
by Justice Barak in the Israeli Supreme Court decision. In fact, the standard is
more permanent than the transitory standard oﬀered by Justice Barak, yet it is
not so permanent that it runs afoul of the “for such time” requirement of the
Optional Protocol. The linking principle is easy to administer, self-applying, and
based on semi-public criteria, which makes it a functional equivalent to being a
member of a military organization. True, this new linking principle is not as easy
to administer as the traditional IHL linking principle of being a member of a military organization, but it is certainly easier to apply than the criminal law notions
of conspiracy and complicity that require intensive fact-based determinations by
a neutral decision-maker. The linking principle is consistent with the underlying
legal principles embedded in the laws of war, as well as the legal instruments that
codify them. Although the linking principle may not be as permissive as some governments would wish, it is better to utilize a narrow linking principle that is legally
and philosophically justiﬁed, rather than a looser linking principle that cannot be
justiﬁed.

130
Cf. ibid. (“A continuous combat function may be openly expressed through the carrying of
uniforms, distinctive signs, or certain weapons. Yet it may also be identiﬁed on the basis of conclusive behaviour, for example, where a person has repeatedly directly participated in hostilities in
support of an organized armed group in circumstances indicating that such conduct constitutes a
continuous function rather than a spontaneous, sporadic, or temporary role assumed for the duration of a particular operation.”)
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